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WHO LET THE DOGS OUT: SHOULD A STADIUM OWNER
BE HELD LIABLE FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED FROM
A MASCOT’S ERRANT HOT DOG TOSS?
JOSHUA D. WINNEKER*, DAVID GARGONE** & SAM C. EHRLICH***
I. INTRODUCTION
Yes, you read that correctly.  Imagine you are at a professional
baseball game with your family, and you are enjoying the atmos-
phere and all that goes into the production of a Major League
game.  Now imagine that the team’s mascot is running around and
tossing items into the stands to help the fans further enjoy their
experience; a relatively common occurrence in professional sports
these days.  You, unfortunately, do not get to enjoy this experience
though because you get hit in the eye with a hot dog wrapped in tin
foil as a result of the mascot’s errant throw into the stands.  This
alleged hot dog “battery” then causes you to suffer a detached ret-
ina, loss of vision and a subsequent cataract requiring two surgeries
to repair all of the damage.  When you went to the stadium that
day, would you have ever thought that this could happen to you?
Getting hit with a foul ball or a bat would be a possibility, but a hot
dog?  Most likely not.
Although this does not seem real, this is exactly what happened
to John Coomer, who is currently embroiled in a lawsuit against the
Kansas City Royals for his eye injury sustained in September 2009,
when the Royals’ mascot, Sluggerrr, hit Coomer with a “behind the
back” hot dog toss.  Coomer’s case is pending in the Missouri Su-
preme Court after he lost at the trial court, but subsequently won at
the Missouri Court of Appeals.  This impending decision, while on
its face seems trivial because of the nature of the object causing the
harm, can actually have widespread implications pertaining to spec-
tator liability at baseball games.  In many jurisdictions, baseball sta-
dium owners have been protected from spectator lawsuits by a
combination of the “baseball limited duty rule” and the fans’ as-
sumption of risk.1  Here, the question is whether the mascot’s antics
of throwing promotional items into the stands are considered to be
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1. See generally Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172 (Nev.
2008).
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inherent and essential to the game of baseball itself such that a fan
assumes the associated risk of their harm.  If so, the stadium owners
will continue to be protected from liability and the injured specta-
tors will be without recourse.  But the Missouri Court of Appeals
refused to give the Royals this protection by ruling that Sluggerrr’s
hot dog toss was not an obvious and known risk associated with at-
tending a baseball game.
This article argues that the Missouri Supreme Court should af-
firm this decision because while mascot activities during a game are
customary at most professional ball parks, it does not rise to the
level of an obvious and known risk that is inherent to the sport of
baseball itself.  Thus, the Court should put stadium owners
throughout the country on notice that they must closely monitor or
alter the currently condoned practices of their mascots or else face
potential liability.
Part I of this article will discuss the development of baseball’s
limited duty rule and the assumption of risk doctrine.  Part II will
address mascot antics at baseball games.  Part III will analyze
Coomer’s case currently pending before the Missouri Supreme
Court and Part IV will provide reasoning for how the Missouri Su-
preme Court should rule.
II. BASEBALL’S LIMITED DUTY RULE AND THE ASSUMPTION
OF RISK DEFENSE
Being injured by a flying object while attending a baseball
game is not a novel concept.  Fans have been hurt by foul balls or
pieces of a bat (or the whole bat) for years, and stadium owners
have been consistently forced to defend these types of lawsuits.2
These lawsuits have all been grounded in tort law under a negli-
gence theory.3  The injured spectator would argue that the stadium
owner failed to exercise reasonable care in protecting the safety of
the patrons at the event, and that the lack of care resulted in the
patron being harmed.4
From very early on, courts found it unfair to hold a stadium
owner liable for an injury that was simply a known part of the game
and part of the fan experience.5  Almost ninety years ago, coinci-
2. See, e.g., Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1913); Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 S.W. 908 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1914).
3. See Crane, 153 S.W. at 1076; see also Edling, 168 S.W. at 908.
4. See Crane, 153 S.W. at 1076; see also Edling, 168 S.W. at 908.
5. See James C. Kozlowski, Majority “Baseball Rule” Limits Spectator Liability,
PARKS & RECREATION MAG. (May 1, 2013), http://www.parksandrecreation.org/
2
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dentally, Missouri led the way in creating protection for stadium
owners against these types of lawsuits in a pair of seminal cases.  In
Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., the plaintiff, injured
by a foul ball, had purchased an unreserved grandstand seat, which
in those days entitled him to a choice between sitting behind home
plate in seats protected by netting, and sitting along the foul lines
in the “unprotected” section of the grandstand.6  In the course of
trial, both sides had agreed to a stipulated statement of facts that
said: “Baseball is our national game, and the rules governing it and
the manner in which it is played and the risks and dangers incident
thereto are matters of common knowledge.”7
The court found this stipulation to be extremely important,
stating that the plaintiff’s agreement with this statement “justif[ies]
the conclusion that he was no novice at the game but was familiar
with the risks and dangers incident in the situation of the spectator
occupying a seat in the grand stand.”8  In ruling that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of danger by choosing to sit in the unprotected
area, the court stated that “the fact that the general public is invited
to  attend these games, that hard balls are thrown and batted with
great force and swiftness, and that such balls often go in the direc-
tion of the spectators,” the duty of the stadium operators merely
includes “providing seats protected by screening from wildly thrown
or foul balls for the use of patrons who desired such protection.”9
Limitations to this rule were set forth a year later in Edling v
Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., again in Missouri, when the
plaintiff was struck by a foul ball while sitting behind the catchers’
box at a Kansas City Blues game in the old American Association.10
The Blues organization had put up chicken netting behind home
plate to protect the grandstand seats in this area, but the netting
had become worn and rotten over time, and large holes had devel-
oped in areas where foul balls were frequent.11  The foul ball in
question had passed through one of these holes, striking the plain-
tiff in the face and breaking his nose, causing an alleged $3,500 in
damages.12
2013/May/Majority-%E2%80%9CBaseball-Rule%E2%80%9D-Limits-Spectator-Lia
bility/.
6. See Crane, 153 S.W. at 1077-78.
7. Id. at 1077-78.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Edling, 168 S.W. at 909.
11. Id.
12. See id. (discussing Plaintiff’s injury and alleged damages).
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Citing Crane, the court in Edling ruled that the stadium owner
had met its duty by providing protection to the area of the grand
stand “most exposed to the battery of foul balls,” which would give
spectators implied assurance that these seats were reasonably pro-
tected.13  While the court stated that other than this protection,
there was no duty of care to protect spectators from being hit by
foul balls, a duty of care was breached by allowing the netting to
become old and rotten.14
“Baseball’s limited duty rule,” as established in Missouri by
Crane and Edling, has since spread to other states in various situa-
tions.15  In 1935, a fourteen-year-old girl was struck and injured by a
foul ball while watching a game from an unprotected seat at Seals
Stadium in San Francisco.16  Citing Edling, the California Supreme
Court ruled that management is not required to protect spectators
from injury by foul and thrown balls and is in fact obligated to pro-
vide screening for all seats since “many patrons prefer to sit where
their view is not obscured by a screen.”17  Along these lines they
ruled that the girl, a high school athlete who had attended the
game alone, and stated at trial that she took the unscreened seat
knowing that she would be in danger of being struck by a batted
ball, had assumed the risk of injury and precluded recovery of
damages.18
While the limited duty rule has generally been applied broadly
in most game situations, the courts have declined to make it a blan-
ket rule for everything that occurs in the grandstand.  In Cincinnati
Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, the plaintiff was struck by a thrown ball
during batting practice in between the two games of a double
header.19  While reversing a summary judgment ruling in favor of
13. See id. at 331-32 (noting Defendant recognized duty to protect patrons
from foul balls by screening portion of grandstand, and thus impliedly assured
reasonable protection to patrons seated behind screen) (citing Crane, 153 S.W at
1077 (“[D]uty of defendants towards their patrons included that of providing seats
protected by screening from wildly thrown or foul balls for the use of patrons who
desired such protection.”)).
14. See id. at 332 (noting duty of reasonable care to ensure screen was free of
defects).
15. See, e.g. Bellezzo v. State, 851 P.2d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (applying
limited duty rule to spectators who had received complementary tickets).
16. See Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144, 145 (Cal. 1935) (discuss-
ing facts and procedural history of case).
17. See id. at 146 (noting management required to exercise ordinary care to
protect patrons from “batted or thrown balls”).
18. See id. at 147 (noting accepting unscreened seat “even temporarily” with
knowledge of danger constituted assumption of risk of injury).
19. See Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 147 N.E. 86, 88 (Ohio 1925) (dis-
cussing facts of case).
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the club, the Supreme Court of Ohio said that the early cases estab-
lishing the limited duty rule were based “upon the proposition that
the plaintiff had such knowledge of the dangers incident to the
game itself that she ‘assumed the risk’ or was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law in sitting in an unscreened seat at the game.”20
While holding up Crane as relevant and important law, the court
ruled that since the specific circumstances created by having nu-
merous groups of players throwing balls around during an intermis-
sion period “differ so essentially” from these cases, a question of
fact still existed as to whether the plaintiff was aware of the particu-
lar danger caused by the circumstances in question.21
Furthermore, in Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., a fan
was hit by a ball hit in batting practice as she was walking around
the concourse on the stadium’s opening day.22  Differing from pre-
vious cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that “even in
a ‘place of amusement’ not every risk is reasonably expected” and
held that the limited duty rule was limited to injuries incurred “as a
result of risks any baseball spectator must and will be held to antici-
pate.”23  Under this notion, they ruled that baseball’s limited duty
rule should only apply to risks which are “common, frequent and
expected.”24  This decision has been directly cited by the Third Cir-
cuit and appellate courts in other states.25
Baseball’s limited duty rule has thus developed to allow sta-
dium owners to provide protective seating in the areas of the sta-
dium that are high risk and potentially dangerous to the fans.26
Once the stadium owner has sufficiently fulfilled that duty, if a spec-
tator is outside of the protected seating and is injured by a foul ball
or bat flying into the stands, the stadium owner will not be held
20. See id. at 87 (discussing Crane decision).
21. See id. at 88-89 (distinguishing Crane, holding whether plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence was question of fact).
22. See Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 547-48 (Pa. 1978)
(discussing facts of case and describing architecture of stadium).
23. See id. at 550-51 (“Movies must be seen in a darkened room, roller coasters
must accelerate and decelerate rapidly and players will bat balls into the
grandstand.”).
24. See id. (explaining limited duty rule does not affect duty of “sports facili-
ties to protect patrons from foreseeably dangerous conditions not inherent in the
amusement activity”).
25. See, e.g., Arce v. U-Pull-It Auto Parts, Inc., No. 06-5593, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10202, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2008); Teneyck v. Roller Hockey Colo., 10
P.3d 707, 708 (Colo. App. 2000); Friend v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 02AP-
135, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 7212, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App., Franklin County Dec. 31,
2002).
26. See Gil Fried & Robin Ammon Jr., Baseball Spectators’ Assumption of Risk: Is It
“Fair” or “Foul”?, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 39, 61 (2002).
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liable because the stadium owner had fulfilled his or her limited
duty to the patrons.27  The court reasoned that the stadium owner
exercised reasonable care to cut down on foreseeable potential in-
juries by providing protected seating, and if a patron leaves that
seating, the patron then assumes the risk of injuries that are inher-
ent in the sport of baseball.28  Therefore, the stadium owner should
not be held accountable for a risk of injury that the fan assumed
prior to even attending the game.
The modern day limited duty rule is perhaps best exemplified
in Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment LLC, where Mrs. Turner
and her husband went to see the minor league Las Vegas 51’s play
at their local stadium.29  While at the game, Mrs. Turner left her
seat to buy an alcoholic beverage at one of the bars within the sta-
dium.30  As she was waiting for her drink, she was struck in the face
27. See id. (discussing details of limited duty rule).
28. For example, in Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, Jane Costa, ac-
companied by three other people, arrived during the fifth inning of a game at
Fenway Park, the home stadium for the Boston Red Sox. See Costa v. Boston Red
Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1100 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).  During the bot-
tom half of the inning, a foul ball was hit in the direction of the group striking the
plaintiff in the face, and causing severe and permanent injuries.  The plaintiff then
filed suit against the Red Sox. Id. at 1091.  In prosecuting her case, the plaintiff
brought in an expert witness, a professor of engineering, to illustrate the nearly
impossible act of getting out of the way of the foul ball that struck her face. Id.
According to the expert witness, when factoring the distance the plaintiff was
seated from the home plate area and the speed of the foul ball, the plaintiff had
less than 1.07 seconds to try and avoid being hit. Id.  The plaintiff also claimed
that she had no prior knowledge of the game of baseball, and assumed that all foul
balls just rolled off to the side of the home plate area. Id. (discussing plaintiff’s
argument). Although the court felt that those circumstances made the incident a
unique situation, the court found that a person of normal intelligence should still
understand that the possible risk of getting hit by a foul ball. Id. at 1093 (discuss-
ing court’s reasoning in reaching conclusion).  Therefore, the court ruled in favor
of the ball club by accepting the primary assumption of risk defense. Id. (holding
assumption of risk bar to recovery for plaintiff).  Furthermore, in Tucker v. ADG,
Inc., the plaintiff was injured during a home game for the Oklahoma Redhawks
professional baseball team. See Tucker v. ADG, Inc., 102 P.3d 660, 662 (Okla.
2004). There, the plaintiff was not seated in the stands but was seated in a luxury
suite above home plate. Id. (discussing facts of case).  During the course of the
game, a foul ball was hit into the luxury suite area and struck the plaintiff in the
face. Id.  The plaintiff sued the stadium owner for negligence, but both the trial
and appellate courts ruled in favor of the defendants. Id. at 663-64. (discussing
holding of case).  The courts ruled that although the plaintiff was not seated in the
stands, the inherent risk of getting hit by a baseball is not eliminated because any
spectator who chooses to watch a baseball game should understand the risk of
getting hit by a foul ball. Id. at 669 (reciting court’s reasoning in reaching its
holding).
29. See generally Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1172
(Nev. 2008) (setting forth facts of case).
30. See id. at 1174 (discussing factual background concerning plaintiff’s
claim).
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss2/4
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 67 Side A      09/19/2014   14:26:10
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 67 Side A      09/19/2014   14:26:10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 7 26-JUN-14 12:41
2014] WHO LET THE DOGS OUT? 375
with a foul ball knocking her unconscious, breaking her nose, and
causing facial lacerations.31  Mrs. Turner then sued the stadium
owner, claiming that her injuries were the result of negligence.32
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and the Nevada
Supreme Court subsequently agreed.33  Specifically, the Nevada Su-
preme Court adopted baseball’s limited duty rule for their state.34
The court explained that as long as the stadium owner under-
takes two necessary steps, then it will fulfill its limited duty to the
patrons.35  First, the stadium owner must provide a “sufficient
amount of protected seating for those spectators who may be rea-
sonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occa-
sion.”36  Next, the stadium owner must provide “protection for all
spectators located in the most dangerous parts of the stadium,”
where there is a high risk of injury from foul balls and bats.37  In the
instant case, Mrs. Turner chose not to sit in protected seating, and
instead went into the beer garden part of the stadium.38  The court
found that the beer garden was not a dangerous part of the stadium
such that Mandalay had to provide protection there as well.39
Therefore, the court held that Mandalay had fulfilled its limited
duty to Mrs. Turner and the rest of the patrons, and thus, it cannot
be subject to liability for a negligence claim caused by an errant
foul ball.40  The court explained that foul balls are a known risk
when entering a baseball game and Mrs. Turner assumed that risk
when she chose not to sit in protected seating.41
Currently, baseball’s limited duty rule is viewed as the “majority
rule” when courts face spectator injuries at baseball games and has
31. See id.
32. See id. (summarizing plaintiff’s legal argument).
33. See id. (exploring procedural history of case as it stood before the court).
34. See id. at 1176 (deciding to adopt limited duty rule in particular context).
35. See Turner, 180 P.3d at 1175 (“[T]he ‘limited duty rule’ . . . places two
important requirements on stadium owners and operators.”).
36. See id. (internal quotation omitted).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1176 (reciting facts of case).
39. See id. (“Here, the record establishes that foul balls occasionally fly into
the Beer Garden, some parts of which have an obstructed view of the field. The
risk of an occasional foul ball, however, does not amount to ‘an unduly high risk of
injury.’”).
40. See id. (stating that “the limited duty rule establishes the totality of the
duty owed by baseball stadium owners and operators to protect spectators from
foul balls within the confines of the stadium. Applying the rule to this case, we
conclude that Mrs. Turner’s negligence claim fails as a matter of law.”).
41. See Turner, 180 P.3d at 1176 (stating that plaintiff’s negligence claim fails
because she choose “not to sit in a protected seating area”).
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been adopted in at least 16 states.42  Additionally, at least four
states: New Jersey, Arizona, Colorado and Illinois have passed laws
codifying the rule.43  Finally, even as courts around the country
have shifted from assumption of the risk to the more plaintiff-
friendly comparative negligence standard, baseball’s limited duty
rule has survived without much effect.44
III. MASCOT ANTICS
The key to the above cases is that any injury from fly balls and
bats outside of the stadium owner’s protected seating is a risk that is
an obvious and known risk that was inherent to the game of base-
ball, thus precluding the spectators’ lawsuits.  But, as noted above,
courts have been reluctant to protect stadium owners when the risk
is not obvious or known to the spectator.45  The question here is
whether Sluggerrr’s antics were inherent to baseball such that
Coomer assumed the risk of being injured by the mascot.  Other
cases addressing mascot antics have ruled in favor of the spectator.
Specifically, the leading case on the antics of a mascot is Lowe
v. California League of Professional Baseball, which held, as a matter of
law, that the actions of a mascot are not inherent to the game of
42. Jake Simpson, Idaho Court’s Baseball Rule Balk Could Impact Other Sports,
LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/427626/
idaho-court-s-baseball-rule-balk-could-impact-other-sports.
43. See N.J. STAT. §§  2A:53A-43; 44; 45; 46; 47; 48 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-554 (1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §13-21-120 (1994); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 38/10
(1992). The limited duty rule does however have its critics.  Specifically, the Idaho
Supreme Court recently declined to adopt the limited duty rule when a fan lost an
eye after being struck by a foul ball during a minor league Boise Hawks’ game in
August 2008. See Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 296 P.3d 373 (Idaho 2013).
The Court stated that there was no compelling public policy reason requiring
them to adopt the limited duty rule because injuries to fans at baseball games was
not a common problem in Idaho. Id. at 378 (“We find no compelling public policy
requiring us to [adopt the Baseball Rule]”).  Instead, the court allowed the injured
fan to maintain a negligence action against the stadium owner. Id. at 380.  The
court noted that it was up to the state legislature to pass a limited duty rule for
baseball stadium owners. Id. at 379.  This case is a departure from the majority
view and could likely be tied to the severity of the injury and not the actual negli-
gence of the stadium owner.  Additionally, the limited duty rule has been ex-
tended to hockey as well. See Kozlowski, supra note 5. R
44. See Lynne Reaves, Eye On the Ball: Injured Spectator Wins, 69 A.B.A. J. 1616
(1983).
45. See Jones, 394 A.2d at 545.  Similarly, in Maytnier v. Rush the court ruled
that a plaintiff struck by a wild ball coming out of the bullpen would not be limited
by the baseball rule since a spectator “does not assume the risk of being hit by a
baseball he does not see, when more than one ball is being used, regardless of
whether the game is in progress or not.” See Maytnier v. Rush, 225 N.E.2d 83, 91
(Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
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baseball.46  In Lowe, the mascot (“Tremor” the dinosaur) hit a fan
several times with its “tail” during a minor league baseball game,
causing the spectator to be distracted from the game and unable to
react to a foul ball, which subsequently hit the spectator in the
face. .47  The fan sued the stadium owner and the stadium owner
responded that it cannot be liable because it had satisfied its limited
duty by providing adequate protective seating that the plaintiff
failed to use.48  The court ruled that while foul balls are an inherent
risk at a baseball game and are essential to the game, the presence
of the mascot is not inherent or essential to the game.49  Specifi-
cally, the court stated:
Thus, foul balls represent an inherent risk to spectators attend-
ing baseball games. Under Knight, such risk is assumed. Can the
same thing be said about the antics of the mascot? We think not.
Actually, the declaration of Mark Monninger, the person who
dressed up as Tremor, recounted that there were occasional games
played when he was not there. In view of this testimony, as a matter
of law, we hold that the antics of the mascot are not an essential or
integral part of the playing of a baseball game. In short,
the game can be played in the absence of such antics.50
The court further stated that the mascot’s antics were a market-
ing tool and that “mascots are needed to make money . . . but are
not essential to the baseball game”.51  While simply having a mascot
in a stadium may be a “common phenomena”52 at a baseball game,
it does not rise to the level of being inherent to the sport itself, such
that the sport cannot go on without them.  Without that aspect, a
spectator cannot be expected to assume the risk of mascots’ antics.
Although the Lowe decision is a California appellate decision, it
correctly acknowledged that a mascot’s presence and antics are not
essential to the game of baseball and this decision should be ex-
tended by the Missouri Supreme Court.
46. See Lowe v. California League of Prof’l. Baseball, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 111
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
47. See id. at 106.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 111.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 108.
52. Harting v. Dayton Dragons, 870 N.E.2d 766, 767 (Ohio Ct. App., Mont-
gomery County 2007) (finding that San Diego Chicken mascot’s antics were “com-
mon phenomena”); Gunther v. Charlotte Baseball, 854 F. Supp. 424, 426 (D.S.C.
1994) (noting that baseball games “routinely involve” distractions, such as “giant
team mascots”).
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IV. COOMER V. KANSAS CITY ROYALS
A. Background and Trial Decision
On September 9, 2009, Coomer went to a Royals game with his
father.53  In order to get closer to the game, instead of sitting in
their ticketed seats, Coomer and his father sat in empty seats six
rows behind the third base dugout.54  Between the third and fourth
innings, the Royals conducted their “Hotdog Launch”.55  This Hot-
dog Launch had been a mainstay at Royals games since 2000.56  The
Royals would throw out between 20-30 hotdogs either through an
air gun or by hand.57  The hotdogs shot through the air gun were
wrapped in bubble wrap but the ones thrown by hand were in tin
foil.58  Sluggerrr, the mascot, would use different types of throws,
including “behind the back” to entertain the fans.59  On the day
Coomer was injured, Sluggerrr was standing on the third base dug-
out launching the hot dogs and Coomer watched as he and his fa-
ther were sitting directly behind the dugout.60  Coomer admitted
that he saw Sluggerrr make a motion with his arm behind his back
but that he looked away for a split second to look at the
scoreboard.61  While looking away, he felt something hit him in the
face, knocking off his hat.62  Two days later, Coomer had a problem
with his vision which turned out to be a detached retina that re-
quired surgery to repair.63  Following the surgery, Coomer lost vi-
sion in his eye for three weeks, later developed a cataract in that
same eye, and had another surgery to correct the cataract and place
an artificial lens in his eye.64
Coomer then filed suit against the Royals alleging that the
Royals were negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care through
its employee/agent, the mascot Sluggerrr.65  The Royals responded
53. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 46, at *2
(Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Coomer, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 46, at *2.
60. See id. at *3.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at *3-4.
64. See id.
65. See Coomer, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 46, at *1.  Coomer also argued that the
hot dog injury was a battery, but the court rejected this claim ruling that there was
no intent to harm on Sluggerrr’s part. See Reply to Plaintiff’s Suggestions in Oppo-
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that they fulfilled their limited duty and therefore the doctrine of
assumption of risk applies as a defense to Coomer’s negligence ac-
tion.66  The Royals argued that Sluggerrr’s hot dog flinging antics
were customary and had become a part of a Royals’ game experi-
ence.67  Coomer’s case eventually made it to trial and the jury delib-
erated for one hour and returned a verdict in favor of the Royals.68
Specifically, the jury found that Coomer himself was 100% liable for
not being aware of his surroundings, which the jury believed actu-
ally caused the damages.69  Coomer appealed the decision all the
way up to the Missouri Supreme Court.
B. Missouri Court of Appeals Decision/Missouri Supreme Court
On appeal, Coomer argued that the trial court erred in submit-
ting the assumption of risk defense to the jury because “the risks
created by a mascot throwing promotional items do not arise from
the inherent nature of a baseball game.”70  The Court of Appeals
first noted that being hit by a baseball is a risk inherent to the
game, but found that being hit in the face with a hot dog was not a
“well-known incidental risk of attending a baseball game.”71  Thus,
the court ruled that the plaintiff could not have consented to and
voluntarily assumed this risk simply by attending the game.72
sition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at *5, Coomer v. Kan. City
Royals Baseball Corp., No. 1016-CV4073, 2011 WL 1397165 (Mo. Cir. Jan. 11,
2011) (“Defendant is also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for
battery as plaintiff has failed to plead the requisite level of intent and in any event
impliedly consented to bodily contact associated with the Hotdog Toss.”).
66. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s Petition at ¶ 3, Coomer
v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 1016-CV04073, 2011 WL 1397165 (Mo. Cir.
Mar. 24, 2010) (providing affirmative defenses applicable to all counts and all alle-
gations in plaintiff’s petition).  Prior to the trial, the man dressed as Sluggerrr who
hit Coomer with the hot dog was relieved of his duties, a new person was hired,
and that person was re-trained in a session led by the former Phillie Phanatic. See
Kevin Underhill, New Royals Mascot Reportedly Training to Avoid Further Hot-Dog Inci-
dents, LOWERING THE BAR (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.loweringthebar.net/2010/
02/new-royals-mascot-reportedly-training-to-avoid-further-hotdog-incidents.html.
67. See Coomer, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 46, at *9 (explaining Royals’ attempt to
portray hot dog launching as customary practice at baseball games).
68. See id. at *4 (describing verdict given and percentage of fault assigned to
each party).
69. See id. (describing percentage of fault jury allocated to Coomer).
70. See id. at *6 (arguing that hot dog throwing is not inherent part of base-
ball experience).
71. See id. at *9 (explaining how court reasoned being hit by a hot dog was not
inherent or expected part of baseball as a whole despite being part of Royals’
tradition).
72. See id. at *9-10 (describing how plaintiff could not assent to something he
was unaware of).
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The Royals disagreed and asserted that the Hotdog Launch was
a customary activity at the games, and therefore, Coomer assumed
this risk by coming to the game.73  Specifically, the Royals asserted
that since Coomer admitted to attending 175 baseball games at
Royals Stadium and saw promotional items thrown at baseball
games, he knew it was a part of the baseball/fan experience.74  The
Royals also explained that the Hotdog Launch was not a new activ-
ity as it had been in practice since 2000.75
Although the Missouri Court of Appeals recognized that the
Hotdog Launch was a customary activity at Royals games, it did not
“equate to a patron’s consent to the risks of being hit by a promo-
tional item.”  The court believed that “inherent risks are those that
inure in the nature of the sport itself” and represent dangers that
are “known and appreciated,” are “perfectly obvious or fully com-
prehended” such that the plaintiff can intelligently acquiesce to the
risk.”76
The Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.77  The Royals appealed
the decision to the Missouri Supreme Court.78  In September 2013,
the Missouri Supreme Court heard oral arguments on this issue.79
Specifically, the Missouri Supreme Court is deciding whether to ex-
tend baseball’s limited duty rule to include the negligent actions of
the teams’ mascots.80  If the Missouri Supreme Court rules in favor
of Coomer, it will have widespread implications to all stadium own-
ers throughout the country, and will likely force many owners to
73. See Coomer, 2013 Mo. App. 46, *9-10 (describing Royals’ argument that hot
dog launching was integral and expected part of their games).
74. See id. (supporting assertion from Royals that Coomer was aware of hot
dog launch).
75. See id. (explaining Royals’ argument that hot dog launch was normal part
of game).  The Royals asserted that the hot dog toss was “an integral part” of a
Royals’ game because it had occurred at every one of the 800 home games the
Royals played since 2000 and that the fans came to “love and respect it.” Un-
derhill, supra note 66. R
76. See Coomer, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 46, at *8 (describing courts’ rationale
for what is normally understood to be part of baseball).
77. See id. at *16-17 (stating courts’ decision to remand case for further
proceedings).
78. See Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 2013 Mo. LEXIS 170 (Mo.
Apr. 30, 2013).
79. See Bill Draper, Fan Hurt by Hotdog Sues Royals, ESPN.COM (Nov. 1, 2013,
4:21 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9911944/fan-injured-hot-dog-
thrown-mascot-suing-kansas-city-royals.
80. See Steve Silver, The Baseball Rule: How Duties to Spectators Continue to Evolve,
LEGAL BLITZ (Nov. 13, 2013), http://thelegalblitz.com/blog/2013/11/19/the-
baseball-rule-how-duties-to-spectators-continue-to-evolve/.
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change their practices as it pertains to mascots and other term per-
sonnel that engage with fans during a game.
V. THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT SHOULD UPHOLD
THE COURT OF APPEALS
This case boils down to one question: are mascots’ antics inher-
ent in the game of baseball?  The Missouri Court of Appeals be-
lieved that Sluggerrr’s actions were “customary” at Royals’ games,
but not inherent to the sport of baseball.  This is in-line with the
Lowe decision in California.  When considering the court’s analysis
of the facts of the case, the Missouri Court of Appeals is correct for
several reasons.
First, although having mascots at baseball games providing en-
tertainment to the fans is something that most fans would expect to
see at a game, the mascots themselves are not needed in order to
play the game.  For example, three Major League Baseball
franchises currently do not have official mascots that are used to
promote the team or are present during baseball games, showing
that while mascots can make a baseball game a more enjoyable ex-
perience, they are certainly not as inherent to the sport as a foul
ball or home run.81  The New York Yankees, Los Angeles Dodgers,
and Los Angeles Angels do not feel it necessary to use mascots for
entertainment purposes, yet each team continues to play games
every season.  Thus, they are not essential to the sport, and their
corresponding conduct would not be inherent to the game.  With
or without mascots, the game of baseball can still be played.
Second, not every team in the league has interactive mascots
such that any fan can go to any game in the country and expect to
see the same behavior from the various teams’ mascots.  This is in
stark contradiction to the fact that every fan that attends any game
in the country would expect to see foul balls and bats flying into the
stands as a natural part of the game.  Thus, in order for the court to
find that the mascots’ antics were inherent to the game, the court
would have to determine a baseline of mascot antics that all of them
follow in order for it to be an obvious and known part of the game.
This would be impossible to do given that every mascot on every
team engages in different activities.82
81. See Ian Crouch, Baseball’s Worst Mascots, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/sportingscene/2014/01/why-is-base
ball-so-bad-at-mascots.html (using fact that three major league teams lack a mascot
to show mascots are not needed in order to actually play a game).
82. See List of Major League Baseball Mascots, available at http://en.wikipedia.
org/w/index.php?title=List_of_Major_League_Baseball_mascots&oldid=6023027
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Third, the assumption of risk doctrine, in this case, is specific
to the game of baseball, and does not specifically identify the pro-
fessional level as its only level of application.  The risk of foul balls
or bats exiting the field of play is existent at all levels of baseball,
not just the professional levels.  The same cannot be said about the
existence of mascots.  They are most prevalent at professional base-
ball games, but not an inherent aspect of the game of baseball.  In-
dividuals attending baseball games at all levels become immediately
aware of the risks associated with attending a baseball game.  How-
ever, they may not be accustomed to the mascot antics or interac-
tions they may encounter at a professional baseball game.  It would
be difficult for a first time spectator at a professional baseball game
to understand the role of a mascot and not be distracted by their
antics.  Furthermore, each professional franchise’s mascot is unique
in its interactions with the crowd, thus leading to an even greater
difficulty in establishing what actions are to be assumed as expected
at a game.
Fourth, while it may seem unfair that this particular plaintiff
was able to bring a lawsuit for an injury that was caused during an
in-game activity that was customary to the Royals’ games since 2000,
and that he admitted to attending 175 Royals’ games, this actually
further proves the point that mascot antics are not inherent to base-
ball itself.  A Hotdog launch in Kansas City may be customary, but
unless every team in every city is doing the same routine as a part of
being able to play the baseball game, it simply is not an inherent
part of the sport.
06 (last visited May 6, 2014) (describing varying traditions and customs of different
sports teams).  Different teams have different philosophies on game presentation,
since each stadium tries to do things a little bit differently in order to be unique
around the league.  For example, while many teams have mascots and/or cheer
squads that use air guns and slingshots to toss souvenirs like t-shirts and plush
baseballs into the stands, some teams do not follow this practice.  The New York
Yankees, for example, have not had a mascot at all since 1982 when they retired
the short lived “Dandy.” Mark Townsend, A Look back at ‘Dandy’ – the forgotten
Yankees Mascot, YAHOO! SPORTS (Nov. 17, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/
mlb-big-league-stew/look-back-dandy-forgotton-yankees-mascot-183709893—mlb.
html.  Occasionally a mascot will take fan interaction to extreme levels; the NBA
Houston Rockets’ mascot Clutch is known for smashing cakes in the faces of op-
posing fans every once in a while. See Chris Strauss, Houston Rockies Mascot Destroys
Lakers Fan with Cake to Face, USA TODAY.COM (Jan. 9, 2013, 6:33 PM), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/gameon/2013/01/09/nba-rockets-mascot-cake-attack/1820
181/.  The Phillie Phanatic has the distinction of being the “most-sued” mascot in
professional sports, having been sued by fans at least four times in its tenure as the
mascot for the Philadelphia Phillies, most recently in 2012 for allegedly picking up
a fan out of a lounge chair in which she was seated and throwing her in a hotel
pool. See Barry Leibowitz, Phillie Phanatic Sued...Again, CBS NEWS (June 13, 2012,
5:38 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/phillie-phanatic-suedagain/.
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V. CONCLUSION
Baseball is a game that is played not only by professionals, but
also by children of all ages.  Spectators of the game learn early on
that on-field play can lead to a dangerous spectator environment
off the field.  The inherent risks of the game of baseball include
baseballs exiting the field of play as foul balls, errant throws, or
homeruns, and whole or fragmented baseball bats exiting the field
when bats are broken or released during a batter’s swing.  The as-
sumption of risk doctrine generally protects stadium operators
from negligence when patrons are injured by these commonplace
occurrences in a baseball game.  Stadium operators using this same
doctrine to justify the actions of mascots suggests that mascots are
as inherent to the game of baseball as foul balls.
If mascots were inherent to the game of baseball, they would
be part of the spectator experience at all levels of the game.  There
are few, if any, little league or high school baseball games with mas-
cots entertaining the crowds.  Two of the most historic professional
baseball franchises in the history of the game do not even have mas-
cots roaming their stands.  If the New York Yankees and Los Ange-
les Dodgers do not view mascots as a vital part of the game of
baseball, it is clear mascots are not an inherent risk of the game of
baseball.
It is also difficult to identify which mascot actions would be
deemed inherent to its act since each mascot entertains spectators
with its own antics.  One of Sluggerrr’s specific antics is the Hotdog
Launch at Kansas City Royals games.  Other mascots may throw t-
shirts, popcorn, hats, or other souvenirs to patrons at the ballpark.
These actions may be part of a team’s attempt to entertain the
crowd, but are not required to enjoy a baseball game.  This is not to
suggest that all mascots are potential liabilities, but those that di-
rectly engage fans may be liable for their actions.
If the Missouri Supreme Court decides to rule in favor of the
Royals, they will be creating a situation where mascots’ antics would
need to be determined on a case-by-case basis that is specific to
each team in each league at all levels of professional baseball.  This
would be unruly in its application and defeats the purpose of deter-
mining that something is inherent to the sport itself.
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